Who is mencius

Other passages indicate that a wise person has the ability to properly assess individuals and has skill at means—end deliberation 5A9. He notes that no sage would kill an innocent person, even if it meant obtaining control of and being able to benefit the whole world 2A2.

Propriety is manifested in respect 6A6 or deference 2A6 toward elders and legitimate authority figures, especially as manifested in ceremonies and etiquette. The character for the virtue of propriety is identical with the one for ritual, reflecting the close connection between this virtue and such practices. Mencius thinks that matters of ritual place legitimate ethical demands on us, but he stresses that they are not categorical, and can be overridden by more exigent obligations.

Knowing when to violate ritual is a matter of wisdom. Mencius discusses other virtues in addition to benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety, but it seems that they are ultimately manifestations of the preceding virtues.

For example, in a nuanced account of courage, Mencius distinguishes between courage as exemplified in stereotypically daring behavior assaulting anyone who insults you , in fearlessness, and in a commitment to righteousness. Mencius suggests that the last kind of courage is the highest form.

Courage based on righteousness will lead to fearless opposition to wrongdoing, but also humble submission when one finds oneself in the wrong. Mencius holds that all humans have innate but incipient tendencies toward benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety. The sprouts are manifested in cognitive and emotional reactions characteristic of the virtues.

For example, all humans feel compassion for the suffering of other humans and animals, at least on some occasions, and this is a manifestation of benevolence. Similarly, every person has some things that he or she would be ashamed to do, or some forms of treatment he or she would disdain to accept, and these are expressions of righteousness.

Our nascent virtues are sporadic and inconsistent in their manifestations. Consequently, a ruler who manifests genuine benevolence when he spares an ox being led to slaughter may nonetheless ignore the suffering of his own subjects. Likewise, someone who would disdain to be addressed disrespectfully may feel no compunction in acting against his convictions in the face of a large bribe. To extend this reaction to that which they will bear is benevolence.

People all have things that they will not do. To extend this reaction to that which they will do is righteousness. If people can fill out the heart that does not desire to harm others, their benevolence will be inexhaustible. The discussion of this issue has a long history, but was revived in Western scholarship by Nivison The basic structure of Mencian extension is clear from this example.

In 1A7, C 1 is the ox being led to slaughter. The king perceives that the ox is suffering, feels compassion for its suffering, and acts to spare it. There is also a case that is relevantly similar to the paradigm case, C 2 , but in which the individual does not currently have the same cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions.

Although his subjects suffer, the king ignores their suffering, has no compassion for it, and does not act to alleviate it. Were the king to extend from the ox to his subjects, he would notice their suffering, feel compassion for them, and change his current military and civil policies.

Later in 1A7, Mencius provides concrete advice about which policies to enact. What is the connection between the king perceiving the logical similarity of the suffering of the ox to the suffering of his own people and the king actually being motivated to act to help his people? When there are benevolent persons in positions of authority, how is it possible for them to trap the people? Mencius illustrates this with an example of learning the board game of go :.

However, classic texts and teachers can assist by inducing or guiding these activities. Mencius similarly tries to induce reflection in a government official who asks whether it is permissible to reduce the crushing tax burden on the peasants slightly this year, and wait until next year to lower it to a reasonable level.

Stories from classic Confucian texts particularly the Odes and Documents are often a stimulus for these discussions, helping to illustrate the role such works play in Mencian ethical education. One aspect of reflection is particularly salient: it is insufficient for successful extension that one merely recognize, in an abstract or theoretical manner, the similarity between two situations.

One must come to be motivated and to act in relevantly similar ways. Because of the preceding requirement, an intense topic of discussion among later Confucians influenced by Mencius is the relationship between knowledge and action. Graham demonstrated in a classic essay, Mencius and his contemporaries regarded the nature of X as the characteristics that X will develop if given a healthy environment for the kind of thing X is.

A characteristic, C, can be part of the nature of X even if there exists an X such that X does not have C. For example, language use is part of the nature of a human being, but there are cases of humans who, due to neurological damage or simply failure to be exposed to language prior to the onset of adolescence, fail to develop a capacity for language use.

It is even possible for C to be part of the nature of X if most instances of X do not have C. For example, it is the nature of an orange tree to bear fruit, but the majority of orange seeds do not even germinate, much less grow to maturity. This thesis runs the danger of becoming viciously circular: we might characterize goodness as the result of growing up in a healthy environment, and a healthy environment as one that results in humans being good.

Human nature is good, on this view, because becoming a good person is the result of developing our innate tendencies toward benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety. These tendencies are manifested in distinctively moral emotions, correlated with the virtues. They will manifest themselves, at least sporadically, in each human. Yet some become great humans and some become petty humans.

Those who follow their petty part become petty humans. Why is it that some follow their greater part and some follow their petty part? However, in ancient Chinese thought, eyes, ears, and the other sensory organs are primarily associated with sensual desires e. Physical desires are never treated as intrinsically problematic. This is an especially acute danger because our sensory desires always respond automatically and effortlessly to their appropriate objects, while our moral motivations are more selective.

If it does not reflect, then it will not get it. I am fond of wealth. If Your Majesty is fond of wealth but treats the commoners the same, what difficulty is there in becoming [a great] King? I am fond of sex. If Your Majesty is fond of sex but treats the commoners the same, what difficulty is there in becoming [a great] King? Zhu Xi held that Mencius was simply explicating what was implicit in the sayings of Confucius.

While ingenious, this interpretation of Mencius is unmotivated without the assumption that the Analects and Mengzi must be expressing the same view. Mencius was often an incisive critic of other philosophers. Another philosopher argues that human nature is identical with the characteristics a human has in virtue of being alive. Mencius performs a swift reductio ad absurdum, pointing out that—since dogs, oxen, and humans are the same in being alive—the proposed definition entails that dogs, oxen, and humans have the same nature 6A3.

If a doctrine does not lean toward Yang Zhu, then it leans toward Mozi. Mozi fifth century BCE is the first systematic philosophical critic of Confucianism. He is generally interpreted as a sort of impartial consequentialist, who grounds ethics in maximizing overall benefit or profit, where this is defined in terms of material goods such as wealth, populousness, and social order. On this basis, Mozi criticizes the Confucian emphasis on ritual, regarding as wasteful such Confucian practices as elaborate funerals, lengthy mourning periods, and musical performances.

Mozi certainly did not advocate eliminating the family as a social institution. However, he argued that human motivations are highly malleable, and can be radically altered, so long as humans are given appropriate rewards for compliance and punishments for disobedience.

As evidence for his claim, he cites the example of. Mozi was not just an original philosophical thinker; he was also the founder of an organized movement, the Mohists, which survived his death and continued to be influential until the Qin dynasty BCE— BCE reunified China.

Although Mohists and Confucians disagreed about many things, they agreed on two key points: the proper Way to live and to organize society is dictated by Heaven, and this Way will sometimes demand extreme self—sacrifice of those who follow it. Yang Zhu appealed to the fact that nothing seems more natural for humans than self—preservation. But if there is a human nature, it must be dictated by Heaven, and therefore must be consistent with the Way. The Mohist response to this, as suggested by the example cited above of King Ling of Chu, was that there is no such thing as human nature; human motivations are highly malleable, and almost exclusively the products of environmental influences.

Mencius agreed with Yang Zhu that humans have a determinate nature. However, he presented arguments that there is more to human nature than the purely self—interested motivations identified by Yang Zhu. His most famous argument for this conclusion is the thought experiment of the child at the well:.

Consequently, Mencius agreed with Yang Zhu that we are following the will of Heaven and hence the Way by following our nature. However, he argued that Yang Zhu had an implausibly impoverished conception of what human nature is like. Against the Mohists, Mencius argues that human nature places practical and ethical constraints on an ethical doctrine.

These points are expressed in an argument Mencius has with the Mohist Yi Zhi. In summary, the impartial caring advocated by the Mohists is both perverse and impractical. Mencius also presents an argument that the Mohist position is self—defeating in practice.

Zhuangzi never refers to Mencius by name, but several passages seem to clearly be directed at him. Mencius then went to Liang, the capital of Wei, a state to the west of Ch'i and Sung. He was well received by the aged King Hui, with whom he had several satisfying interviews. Mencius had a less amiable relationship with Hui's successor, Hsiang, who became king in , and Mencius decided to return to Ch'i. In order to enhance Ch'i's prestige the Ch'i rulers had built in the Ch'i capital an academy called Chihsia, where scholars from all parts of China were invited to study and exchange ideas.

Members of the academy included some of the most important thinkers of the time. It is not certain whether Mencius was an actual participant at the Chi-hsia discussions, although he certainly must have been acquainted with many of the scholars who were there. Mencius was given an honorary position in the Ch'i government but does not seem to have held a policy-making post.

Mencius was rather stuffy, terribly serious, and somewhat of a prude. To him principle was of paramount importance. Mencius arrogantly answered that the Confucian school had never professed interest in the hegemons, and thus he had nothing to say on the matter. He then proceeded to give a long, abstract discourse on what he termed true kingship, citing examples from remote antiquity to illustrate his argument.

Mencius's career in Ch'i was temporarily interrupted by the death of his mother. He returned to Lu, where he conducted an elaborate funeral for her and observed mourning for the prescribed period of 3 years.

In Ch'i attacked the state of Yen in the northeast. Mencius, not wishing to commit himself, gave an evasive answer which the King construed as approval.

Actually, Mencius had reservations about this course of action and was disturbed that the King failed to understand his advice. In Yen expelled the Ch'i army. Mencius remained in Tsou for the rest of his life. Thus, Mencius makes an assertion about human beings — all have a heart-mind that feels for others — and qualifies his assertion with appeals to common experience and logical argument.

This does little to distinguish him from other early Chinese thinkers, who also noticed that human beings were capable of altruism as well as selfishness. What remains is for him to explain why other thinkers are incorrect when they ascribe positive evil to human nature — that human beings are such that they actively seek to do wrong. A heart-mind that sympathizes is the sprout of co-humanity [ren]; a heart-mind that is aware of shame is the sprout of rightness [yi]; a heart-mind that defers to others is the sprout of ritual propriety [li]; a heart-mind that approves and condemns is the sprout of wisdom [zhi]….

If anyone having the four sprouts within himself knows how to develop them to the full, it is like fire catching alight, or a spring as it first bursts through. If able to develop them, he is able to protect the entire world; if unable, he is unable to serve even his parents. If our sprouts are left untended, we can be no more than merely human — feeling sorrow at the suffering of another, but unable or unwilling to do anything about it. If we tend our sprouts assiduously — through education in the classical texts, formation by ritual propriety, fulfillment of social norms, etc.

Has Your Majesty noticed rice shoots? If there is drought during the seventh and eighth months, the shoots wither, but if dense clouds gather in the sky and a torrent of rain falls, the shoots suddenly revive. When that happens, who could stop it? If that does happen, the people will go over to him as water tends downwards, in a torrent — who could stop it? He does so using examples taken from that quintessentially Confucian arena of human relations, filial piety xiao.

For Mencius, this demonstrates that the internal orientation of the agent e. Having made a teleological argument from the inborn potential of human beings to the presumption of virtues that can be developed, Mencius then offers his sketch of moral psychology — the structures within the human person that make such potential identifiable and such development possible. As Antonio S. It is especially abundant outdoors at night and in the early morning, which is why taking fresh air at these times can act as a physical and spiritual tonic 6A8.

When Mencius is asked about his personal strengths, he says:. It is the sort of qi that is utmost in vastness, utmost in firmness. If, by uprightness, you nourish it and do not interfere with it, it fills the space between Heaven and Earth.

It is the sort of qi that matches the right [yi] with the Way [Dao]; without these, it starves. It is generated by the accumulation of right [yi] — one cannot attain it by sporadic righteousness.

It is here that Mencius is at his most mystical, and recent scholarship has suggested that he and his disciples may have practiced a form of meditative discipline akin to yoga. Chan has pointed out, ethics and spirituality are not mutually exclusive, either in the Mencius or elsewhere. To sum up, both biology and culture are important for Mencian self-cultivation, and so is Tian.

Nature is crucial, but so is nurture. Nonetheless, an outline of the most important commentators and their philosophical trajectories is worth including here. Gaozi, who is known only from the Mencius , evidently knew Mencius personally, but Xunzi knew him only retrospectively.

Gaozi — whom later Confucians identified, probably anachronistically, as a Daoist — offers multiple hypotheses about human nature, each of which Mencius refutes in Socratic fashion.

Gaozi first argues that human nature is neither bad nor good, and presents two organic metaphors for its moral neutrality: wood which can be carved into any object and water which can be made to flow east or west. It is possible to make people bad, just as it is possible to make water flow up — but neither is a natural process or end.

Against Mencius, Xunzi defines human nature as what is inborn and unlearned, and then asks why education and ritual are necessary for Mencius if people really are good by nature. Whereas Mencius claims that human beings are originally good but argues for the necessity of self-cultivation, Xunzi claims that human beings are originally bad but argues that they can be reformed, even perfected, through self-cultivation.

Also like Mencius, Xunzi sees li as the key to the cultivation of renxing. Through an accident of history, Mencius had no occasion to meet Xunzi and thus no opportunity to refute his arguments, but if he had, he might have replied that Xunzi cannot truly believe in the original depravity of human beings, or else he could not place such great faith in the morally-transformative power of culture.

Li [cosmic order] and yi [rightness]. More recently, the philosophers Roger Ames and Donald Munro have developed postmodern readings of Mencius that involve contemporary developments such as process thought and evolutionary psychology. Their work is an attempt to make Mencius not only intelligible, but also valuable, to contemporary Westerners. At the same time, critics have noted that much of the authentic Mencius may be discarded on the cutting room floor in this process of reclaiming him for contemporary minds.

Mencius c. The Mencius of History Like the historical Confucius, the historical Mencius is available only through a text that, in its complete form at least, postdates his traditional lifetime BCE.

The Mencius of the Text Mencius inherits from Confucius a set of terms and a series of problems. Theodicy Again, as with Confucius, so too with Mencius.

His ideal ruler is the sage-king, such as the legendary Shun, on whose reign both divine sanction and popular approval conferred legitimacy: When he was put in charge of sacrifices, the hundred gods delighted in them which is Heaven accepting him. Human Nature Mencius is famous for claiming that human nature renxing is good. Appealing to experience, he says: Supposing people see a child fall into a well — they all have a heart-mind that is shocked and sympathetic. Going further and appealing to reason, Mencius argues: Judging by this, without a heart-mind that sympathizes one is not human; without a heart-mind aware of shame, one is not human; without a heart-mind that defers to others, one is not human; and without a heart-mind that approves and condemns, one is not human.

When Mencius is asked about his personal strengths, he says: I know how to speak, and I am good at nourishing my flood-like qi.

References and Further Reading Allan, Sarah. The Way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue.